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Executive Summary 
 
To make prudent recommendations for improving the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
policy settings, some measures of how well it is actually done are essential. This paper develops 
new insights on the potential usefulness of government cost-benefit analysis by examining how it 
is actually performed in the U.S. 
 
We assess the quality of a particularly rich sample of cost-benefit analyses of federal 
regulations. The data set we use for assessing the quality of regulatory analysis is the largest 
assembled to date for this purpose. The seventy-four analyses we examine span the Reagan, the 
first Bush and the Clinton administrations. The paper is the first to assess systematically how 
government cost-benefit analysis has changed over time.  
 
There are three key findings. First, a significant percentage of the analyses in all three 
administrations do not provide some very basic economic information, such as information on 
net benefits and policy alternatives. For example, over 70% of the analyses in the sample failed 
to provide any quantitative information on net benefits. Second, there is no clear trend in the 
quality of cost-benefit analysis across administrations. Third, there is a great deal of variation in 
the quality of individual cost-benefit analyses. 
      1 
How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis? 




Over the past several decades, there have been numerous critiques of the application of 
economic approaches to problems in public policy.  Several books and articles have been written 
that criticize cost-benefit analysis and economic policy analysis more broadly (Ackerman and 
Heinzerling 2002). There have also been a number of defenses of economic approaches to 
analyzing important public policy issues. For example, Justice Breyer argues that government 
needs to set regulatory priorities differently so that more lives can be saved with a given level of 
expenditures (Breyer 1993). Sunstein (2002) takes a different approach, but also supports the 
expanded use of cost-benefit analysis. 
The debate over the use of economic analysis as a tool in regulatory decision making is 
more than academic. Countries and states throughout the world are requiring extensive use of 
cost-benefit analysis and related tools as a way of informing key regulatory decisions and 
reforming the regulatory process.  In the U.S., for example, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB)—the agency charged with regulatory oversight—is using cost-benefit analysis to 
both improve regulatory proposals and stimulate the implementation of new measures where the 
benefits exceed the costs (OMB 2002). 
  The use of cost-benefit analysis has been particularly controversial in the area of 
environmental, health and safety regulation (Adler and Posner 2000). According to government 
estimates, the costs associated with such regulation are substantial—on the order of $200 billion 
(in 1996 dollars) annually (OMB 2001). The benefits, which are harder to pin down, may be 
even larger, although the net benefits (or costs) of individual regulations can vary significantly 
(OMB 2001; Hahn 2000; Freeman 2002; Morrall 2003). Thus, making even relatively modest 
changes in the regulatory apparatus could have significant implications for the public’s health 
and welfare. 
Economists generally believe that cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool for helping 
decision makers better assess the impact of policies (Lave 1982; Viscusi 1996; Portney 1990; 
Arrow, et al. 1996). Cost-benefit analysis can help decision makers select policies with positive 
net social benefits; identify the likely winners and losers from a policy; evaluate the impact of      2 
uncertainty on the net benefits of different policies; and assess the potential value of new 
information (Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978; Raiffa 1970). 
Cost-benefit analysis can also help identify key deficiencies in our understanding of a 
particular policy issue, and show how sensitive the results are to different assumptions (Viscusi 
and Hamilton 1999). For example, an analyst may be able to quantify the likely economic costs 
of requiring passengers to have their bags screened at airports, but may not be able to assess the 
likely benefits of such a policy. An analysis of an environmental regulation may highlight that 
we do not really understand the pathway by which humans are exposed. In short, cost-benefit 
analysis can provide a useful framework for understanding the implications of different policy 
choices and whether a proposed regulation offers social net benefits (Sunstein 2002). 
  Scholars differ over the extent to which cost-benefit analysis should be used as a tool for 
making policy choices. Some take the view that before a government policy is implemented, 
there needs to be reasonable evidence that the benefits of that policy are likely to exceed the 
costs, and that the particular option chosen offers the highest expected net benefits (Crandall, et 
al. 1997). Others believe that the decision maker should have more discretion, but that cost-
benefit analysis can provide a useful input into policy-making (Arrow, et al. 1996; Sunstein 
2002). Still others believe that cost-benefit analysis is not terribly useful in a number of settings 
because of practical or theoretical problems (Chichilnisky 1997; Kelman 1981). 
  Economics, as a profession, should take special interest in cost-benefit analysis. Outside 
of the Federal Reserve, this may be the area of public policy where economic ideas are used most 
often. Knowing the strengths and weaknesses of these analyses will help economists both inside 
and outside the government understand how cost-benefit analysis can be more effectively used to 
improve public policy. 
In order to make prudent recommendations for improving the use of cost-benefit analysis 
in policy settings, we need to have some measures of how well such analyses are actually done, 
since the utility of a particular analysis depends, in large part, on its quality. Of course, even a 
reasonably good analysis does not assure that the ensuing decision will be sensible. But if the 
analysis is poor, it is certainly more likely that decision makers will make poor decisions. So, for 
example, a poor analysis of a water quality regulation could lead to the selection of a policy that 
results in lower levels of water quality than might be achieved with a policy that could have been 
selected with a better analysis.      3 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how cost-benefit analysis is actually performed 
by U.S. government agencies. To this end, we assess the quality of a sample of 74 cost-benefit 
analyses of federal environmental regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
that span the Reagan, the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. The paper is the first to 
assess systematically how government cost-benefit analysis has changed over time and uses the 
largest data set assembled to date.
1  
Our analysis is possible because since 1981, the U.S. government has required that a 
cost-benefit analysis be conducted for all economically significant federal regulations—
regulations that frequently cost billions of dollars annually. Even though they are ex ante 
analyses, these regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) represent the most comprehensive set of data 
about the consequences of regulation in the U.S. 
  The paper has three key findings related to the actual practice of cost-benefit analysis. 
First, a significant percentage of the analyses done by the EPA do not report some very basic 
economic information. Second, there is no clear trend in the quality of cost-benefit analysis 
across administrations. Third, there is a great deal of variation in the quality of individual cost-
benefit analyses.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional 
and historical background on the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decision making in the 
U.S. Section 3 describes the main approaches for measuring the quality of regulatory analyses 
and presents the analytical approach used in this study. Section 4 describes the results of our 
analysis. Section 5 discusses implications of the results and offers some policy 
recommendations. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Government Requirements for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Regulation 
 
  Federal regulation has grown dramatically in the last fifty years. Although regulations 
resulting from legislative mandates often have little direct fiscal impact, they pose real costs to 
consumers and businesses. Initially, however, the economic impacts of federal regulation 
received much less scrutiny than discretionary programs in the budget, even though such 
regulations have important implications for economic efficiency. Early efforts to rationalize the 
                                                           
1 Hahn et al. (2000), GAO (1997), GAO (1998), Smith (1984) and Morgenstern (1997), among others, evaluate a 
significant number of RIAs, but none focuses on whether there is a time trend.      4 
regulatory process can be traced to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, but much more significant 
action started with President Reagan (Weidenbaum 1997). 
  Over the last two decades, both Congress and the Executive Branch have initiated 
regulatory reforms in order to better assess the impacts of regulation on economic activity and to 
encourage the development of more effective and efficient regulations (Sunstein 2002; Hahn 
2000; Renda 2006). For example, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton directed all agencies to 
perform economic analyses of major regulations that show whether a regulation’s benefits were 
likely to exceed its costs and whether alternatives to that regulation would be more effective or 
less costly. Each president also attempted to increase agency accountability for decisions by 
requiring that OMB review all major regulations. More recently, Congress has also embraced 
regulatory reform. For example, Congress inserted analytical requirements and accountability 
mechanisms, including regulatory oversight, sunset provisions, regulatory budgets, and peer 
review, into laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, the Small Business 
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. In 
addition, Congress has passed laws that require OMB to produce regular reports on the costs and 
benefits of federal regulation (e.g., OMB 2004; OMB 2005).  
  The most prominent and far-reaching of these regulatory reform efforts are President 
Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 and President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866.
2 Both of these 
executive orders require agencies to prepare an RIA for all major federal regulations.  
Thus, agencies have been preparing RIAs for over twenty-five years. The basic 
requirements placed on agencies have remained constant, even though some of the details have 
changed. Both Executive Order 12291 and 12866 require agencies to consider all significant 
costs and benefits, including those that cannot be quantified. Furthermore, agencies must 
consider all alternatives and choose the one that maximizes net benefits or minimizes net costs.
3 
Both executive orders place OMB in charge of overseeing the regulatory process. However, 
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 places more emphasis on distributional concerns and public 
transparency of the regulatory process. Executive Order 12866 also requires agencies to show 
that the benefits “justify” the costs, in contrast to Reagan’s Executive Order 12291, which 
                                                           
2 President George W. Bush recently amended Executive Order 12866. The basic thrust of the new order is the same 
with regard to economic analysis of regulations. But the new order also requires more careful scrutiny of regulatory 
guidance from agencies.  
3 This requirement does not apply if the law forbids it, as is the case with setting national ambient air quality 
standards.  Executive Order 12291, however, specifically calls for the analysis of alternative approaches that could 
result in higher net benefits, along with an explanation of the legal reasons why the alternatives could not be 
adopted.       5 
requires that the benefits “outweigh” the costs. Both allow for analyzing some effects in 
qualitative terms only. Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 acknowledges that some effects “cannot 
be quantified in monetary terms,” while Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 specifically calls for 
quantifiable measures “to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated.” 
OMB has issued guidelines and memos instructing agencies on how to comply with the 
relevant executive orders (OMB Guidelines 1996). The EPA also issued its own set of 
guidelines, detailing how RIAs should comply with the executive orders (EPA 1983). The basic 
instructions, such as quantifying as many costs and benefits as possible and evaluating 
alternatives, have remained constant over the past twenty-five years. These are the elements of 
the RIA that we examine below. 
 
III. Assessing the “Quality” of Regulatory Analyses
 
  The quality of a cost-benefit analysis is intrinsically hard to measure. There are 
essentially three approaches for measuring the quality of regulatory analyses. One is to have 
experts carefully examine the details of a particular cost-benefit analysis or group of analyses, 
such as key assumptions and results (Morgenstern, ed. 1997; Smith, ed. 1984; Sunstein 2002; 
Lutter and Gruenspecht 2001; White 1981). The main advantage of such a case-study approach 
is that detailed analysis of individual cases can highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
data, assumptions, and underlying models. A major weakness of this approach is that the 
analytical methods are not easily generalized and the results are not easily replicated. 
Furthermore, reasonable people may disagree about the relative quality of analyses because of 
the highly subjective nature of the case study approach. 
  The second approach uses estimates of a key parameter, such as net benefits or cost 
effectiveness, from studies done before and after the implementation of a policy (Harrington, et 
al. 2000; OMB 2005). The idea is that the estimate done after a study provides a better measure 
of the actual impact of a policy.  This approach poses a number of challenges from the standpoint 
of measuring quality. First, it depends on the state of information available when the studies are 
done. Second, analyses done before and after the fact could differ for a number of reasons related 
to methodology and assumptions, and this needs to be taken into account. Third, there have been      6 
relatively few studies of this kind because accurately estimating the ex post effects of a 
regulation can be difficult and costly, and there is little political payoff to having such estimates.
4
A third method is to score a large number of cost-benefit analyses according to whether 
they meet a number of basic, objective criteria, such as whether some costs and benefits were 
monetized, whether costs and benefits were discounted, and whether alternatives were 
considered (Hahn et al. 2000; GAO 1997; GAO 1998).  
A great advantage of the scorecard method is that it requires no detailed knowledge of the 
assumptions and calculations underlying a particular analysis, and does not require the 
researchers to judge whether the estimates are correct or based on sound science, only whether or 
not they were presented in an RIA. The definition of a good RIA is very specific—it follows the 
basic requirements set forth in the executive orders and OMB guidelines. In this sense, the 
scorecard is objective, and other researchers should be able to reproduce the results. 
A potential disadvantage to this focus on reporting, rather than on the underlying 
assumptions or methods, is that an RIA could receive a high score and still be poorly done. In the 
extreme, an RIA could receive a perfect score if all of the appropriate estimates are included, but 
still be of low quality if all of the estimates are wrong. In other words, the scorecard approach 
precludes critical evaluation of the agency estimates, which may be biased or compromised by 
analytical flaws. However, since many of the questions on the scorecard are quite basic, an RIA 
with a low score is unlikely to be of high quality.  
Furthermore, the scorecard does not measure the impacts that RIAs may have on the 
process of regulation itself, such as increasing transparency, encouraging debate, or changing 
policy. Such benefits are potentially significant, but they can not be captured by the scorecard 
used in this study.  
 
A. Approach of the Current Study
  This study uses the scorecard method described above to identify common strengths and 
weaknesses among a relatively large sample of RIAs. We assess the quality of seventy-four 
agency RIAs by testing how well they meet the government’s own standards for economic 
analysis, as described in Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, and the OMB guidelines (Reagan 
1981; Clinton 1993; OMB 1996).
5  
                                                           
4 Politicians are typically not interested in supporting analyses of regulations and programs because they are costly 
and have the potential to put initiatives they support in a bad light.   
5 A list of the 74 RIAs studied is available as supplementary material linked to the online manuscript.      7 
Executive Order 12866 states, for example, that agencies shall provide “an assessment, 
including the underlying analysis,” of benefits and costs expected from a regulation and, “to the 
fullest extent,” provide a quantification of those benefits and costs. The OMB guidelines further 
direct agencies to express benefits and costs in monetary terms “to the fullest extent possible.” In 
addition, they identify and discuss principles for placing an explicit value on benefits that are 
difficult to monetize, such as environmental amenities (OMB 1996). Executive Order 12866 also 
requires that agencies specifically assess the effects of regulations on State, local, and tribal 
governments. In addition, Executive Order 12866 states that “agencies should assess all costs 
and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating” 
(Clinton 1993, § 1(a)). The OMB guidelines further provide agencies with a recommended 
approach for evaluating alternatives, such as urging agencies to define carefully the proper 
baseline, to discuss uncertainty and bias in estimates, and to carefully describe key assumptions 
used in developing estimates of benefits and costs (OMB 1996). The EPA guidelines even list 
the types of alternatives that may be considered when evaluating a proposal. Finally, according 
to Executive Order 12866, the RIA must provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the 
agency is selecting the regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits, unless the approach is 
prohibited by statute.  
Based on the executive orders and OMB guidelines, the authors developed a “regulatory 
scorecard” consisting of a series of yes/no questions, such as: Did the RIA state that costs exist? 
Did the RIA monetize at least some benefits? Did the RIA calculate a measure of cost 
effectiveness? Each item listed on the scorecard represents an essential element of a good 
economic analysis. The questions on the scorecard are similar to those used in previous research 
(Hahn et al. 2000) and are available as supplementary material linked to the online manuscript. 
 
B. The Sample
The sample used in this study consists of a total of seventy-four RIAs—twenty-seven 
from the Reagan administration, twenty-four from the George H. W. Bush administration, and 
twenty-three from the Clinton administration. The RIAs were published from 1982 to 1999. All 
of the RIAs were from the EPA. EPA was selected because it accounts for a majority of all 
available regulatory analyses and more than half of the total costs of regulation (Hahn 2000; 
OMB 2001).  We chose to focus on a single agency to minimize variations in quality across 
agencies. In addition, many agencies have not written enough RIAs to form a significant sample      8 
for each administration. While there has been some analyses comparing RIAs across agencies, 
they have suffered from small sample sizes (GAO 1998; Hahn et al. 2000). 
The sample includes as many available RIAs as could be found from 1982 to 1992 and all 
of the Clinton-era EPA rules included in Hahn et al. (2000), which covered all rules published in 
the Federal Register between April 1996 and July 1999. With a few exceptions, such as rules 
passed under emergency circumstances, agencies produce RIAs for all major rules. Although 
there is some overlap, this sample is different from Hahn et al. (2000), which examined multiple 
agencies during one administration. This study examines one agency across multiple 
administrations. RIAs were obtained through web searches, through searches of the agency’s 
dockets, and through officials at OMB, EPA and the General Accounting Office.  
Our search was thorough and our sample is larger than any previous efforts. We 
acknowledge, however, that we may be missing some RIAs written during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, because until Congress required OMB to issue annual reports on regulation in 
the mid-1990s, there was no official public record of which regulations had been analyzed under 
the executive orders. Nor were agencies required to keep copies of old RIAs. The most 
exhaustive public record of environmental RIAs we could find was kept by the National Center 
for Environmental Economics, a division of the EPA.  We thoroughly checked this library for 
RIAs both online and at EPA headquarters.
6  
Because more environmental rules were passed during the Clinton administration than 
during Reagan or Bush, we decided that we did not need the entire eight years in order to make a 
fair comparison. Therefore, we chose the RIAs used in Hahn et al. (2000). The RIAs themselves 
were written between 1993 and 1999, representing six years of the Clinton administration. We 
decided not to cover the current Bush administration because there were not sufficient data when 
we began our research.
7  
This study includes rules that address market failures, such as improving air quality. It 
excludes “transfer” rules, which are rules designed to move resources from the federal 
government to designated segments of the population, because agencies generally do not assess 
the costs and benefits of such rules (OMB 2001; OMB 2002).   
 
                                                           
6 We know we are missing RIAs for four rules for which we could not find complete information. These are listed in 
the supplementary material linked to the online manuscript.  
7 Note that electronic copies of all the documents used in this study, as well as RIAs from other agencies, can be 
found in the RIA Database at www.aei-brookings.org.      9 
IV. Results
 
The results of our analysis point to three key findings. The first finding is that quality, as 
measured by the inclusion of fundamental economic information, is generally low. The second 
finding is that the quality of the cost-benefit analyses does not seem to change over time and 
across administrations. The third finding is that individual RIAs vary widely in quality even 
within administrations. These results are discussed in more detail below.  
 
A. Inclusion of Fundamental Economic Information  
The findings concerning the inclusion of fundamental economic information are divided 
into six categories: costs, benefits, comparison of costs and benefits, consideration of 
alternatives, clarity of presentation, and the use of analytical assumptions. 
 
Costs 
  The EPA has consistently presented cost estimates in RIAs done during the Reagan, first 
Bush, and Clinton administrations. Figure 1 summarizes the key results on costs. All RIAs stated 
that costs exist, quantified at least some costs, and monetized at least some costs. Costs are 
considered to be quantified if they are expressed in some countable unit, such as dollars, labor 
hours, or new machinery. They are considered monetized if those units are assigned monetary 
values, such as stating that the cost of compliance will be one hundred million dollars. 
Monetization implies quantification, but not vice versa.  
Not all RIAs gave an estimate of total costs.
8  In the Reagan administration, 15 percent of 
the RIAs provided neither a point estimate nor a range for total costs.
9  During the Bush 
administration, 17 percent provided neither a point estimate nor a range, and during the Clinton 
administration, 4 percent provided neither a point estimate nor a range. During the Reagan and 
Clinton administrations, point estimates of total costs were more common than ranges. During 
the Bush administration, point estimates were as common as ranges. The reason for this is not 
clear.  Few RIAs provided both a point estimate and range during any administration.  
                                                           
8 An estimate of total costs is defined as an estimate that is summed across regions of the country, affected 
industries, subsections of the rule or other relevant subtotals. The cost from a case study, which may apply to one or 
a few plants, is not considered to be an estimate of total cost. 
9 A point estimate is defined as an estimate that is a single number, as opposed to a range. A range estimate is 
defined as an estimate that includes two points and is inclusive of a significant portion of the confidence interval of 
an estimate. Note that two case studies do not count as a range of total costs.      10 
While virtually all of the RIAs studied included estimates of costs to producers (over 90 
percent for all administrations), fewer included estimates of administrative costs to the federal 




  As shown in Figure 2, the RIAs did not present estimates of benefits as consistently as 
costs. Like costs, benefits are considered to be quantified if they are expressed in some countable 
unit, such as dollars, lives saved, or tons of pollution reduced. They are considered monetized if 
those units are assigned monetary values. While 100% of the RIAs monetized at least some 
costs, only about 50% monetized at least some benefits. The number of RIAs that quantified at 
least some benefits was significantly higher—exceeding 80% for all three administrations. This 
result suggests that some benefits are not easily monetized and/or that the agency is reluctant to 
monetize some benefits.  
In contrast to the cost estimates, estimates of total monetized benefits were fairly evenly 
divided between analyses that reported point estimates and those that reported ranges. As with 
the estimates of costs, providing both a point estimate and a range for total monetized benefits 
was rare—13% or less for all three administrations.  Overall, while many RIAs quantified 
benefits and a significant number monetized benefits, the estimation of benefits lags well behind 
the estimation of costs.   
 
Comparison of Costs and Benefits 
Economists frequently focus on measures of net benefits.  Comparing costs and benefits 
gives decision makers a deeper insight into the likely impact of different policies in terms of their 
net benefits or the costs of achieving various goals. Unfortunately, as summarized in Figure 3, 
EPA has not consistently used these measures.  In the Clinton administration, EPA calculated at 
least one measure of net benefits 39% of the time, compared with 26% during the Reagan 
administration and 29% during the Bush administration. For cost effectiveness, the numbers 
were somewhat higher—52% for Clinton, 56 % for Reagan and 42% for Bush. It is not surprising 
that cost effectiveness was calculated more often than net benefits. This is because calculation of 
net benefits requires monetized costs and monetized benefits, while calculation of cost 
effectiveness requires only monetized costs and quantified benefits. All RIAs monetized at least      11 
some costs, but more RIAs quantified benefits than monetized benefits. Therefore, more RIAs 
had the information necessary to calculate cost effectiveness rather than net benefits.  
RIAs tended to calculate either cost effectiveness or net benefits, but rarely both. During 
the Clinton administration, 74% of the RIAs calculated a measure of either net benefits or cost 
effectiveness. For the Reagan and Bush administrations, the numbers were lower—70% and 
50%, respectively. No more than 21% of RIAs in any administration reported both net benefits 
and cost effectiveness. 
    These findings illustrate how difficult it would be to use basic quantitative information on 
net benefits or cost effectiveness for decision making. In 35% of the regulations examined here, 
such information simply is not reported. Indeed, net benefit information does not exist for 69% 
of the RIAs in the sample. However, EPA does not appear to be using all of the quantitative 
information that it does have to calculate net benefits and cost effectiveness. Of the rules in the 
sample that monetized benefits, only 58% calculated net benefits. Of the rules in the sample that 
quantified benefits, only 74% calculated cost effectiveness or net benefits. This suggests that 
comparisons of costs and benefits are not occurring in a large number of cases for which the 
necessary data are actually available.  
  As shown in Figure 4, there are some differences in the presentation of these data across 
administrations. In all three administrations, the EPA preferred point estimates to ranges for total 
cost effectiveness. But for total net benefits during the Reagan and Clinton administrations, 
however, the EPA preferred ranges to point estimates.  In addition, the percentage of RIAs 
presenting total cost-effectiveness estimates has grown across administrations. During the 
Reagan administration, only 37% of RIAs presented a point or range estimate of total cost 
effectiveness. That number increased to 42% during the Bush administration and to 48% during 
the Clinton administration. An RIA could get credit for some measure of cost effectiveness, but 
not for a total estimate of cost effectiveness, if for example, it calculated the cost effectiveness 
using only a case study estimate instead of a national average. A cost-effectiveness estimate was 
scored as a total estimate if the numerator (the costs) met the definition of total cost given above. 
 
Consideration of Alternatives 
  Evaluation of alternatives is critical in determining which policies yield the highest net 
benefits. An alternative is defined as any policy that seeks to achieve the same end through a 
different method (e.g., pollution trading or taxation, self-regulation) or at a different level (e.g.,      12 
emissions are capped but at a higher or lower level). In this study, not regulating was considered 
an alternative if the RIA provided specific calculations or an analysis of that scenario. 
Background information on externalities or market failures was not scored as an analysis of not 
regulating. 
Figure 5 provides some key statistics on the consideration and presentation of alternatives 
in the RIAs. For several items on the scorecard, the reporting on alternatives has gotten worse 
over time. The percentage of RIAs that considered at least one alternative standard or level 
decreased from 85% during the Reagan administration to 74% during the Clinton administration. 
The percentage that monetized the costs of alternatives dropped from 78% to 43% and the 
percentage that quantified the benefits of alternatives decreased from 59% to 35%. In contrast, 
there has been no decline in the monetization of benefits of alternative policies. 
  In terms of net benefits and cost effectiveness, there has been a general pattern of 
incomplete comparisons of alternatives (see Figure 6). The percentage of RIAs that calculated 
cost effectiveness of alternatives decreased across administrations, from 37% during the Reagan 
administration to 33% during the Bush administration to 9% during the Clinton administration. 
The calculation of the net benefits of alternatives was not very common either, with only 27% of 
the RIAs calculating any net benefits of alternatives. The percentage of RIAs that calculated 
either net benefits or cost effectiveness of alternatives peaked at 59% in the Reagan 
administration and averaged 46% for all RIAs. 
 
Clarity of Presentation 
  In addition to presenting estimates of costs and benefits, RIAs should help the public 
understand EPA’s decisions. In fact, the objective of Executive Order 12866 was to make the 
process “more accessible and open to the public.” A clear and transparent presentation is vital to 
fulfilling this goal. Since RIAs are often hundreds of pages long, it is important for RIAs to have 
an executive summary (called an introduction in some RIAs). Approximately 80% of the RIAs 
included an executive summary. Figure 7 summarizes the content of these executive summaries. 
Overall, the percentage of RIAs that included an executive summary decreased from 85% during 
the Reagan administration to 70% during the Clinton administration. The percentage of RIAs 
that included an executive summary with some monetized costs decreased from 78% during the 
Reagan administration to 70% during the Clinton administration. The percentage that included 
an executive summary with some monetized benefits increased from 41% during the Reagan      13 
administration to 52% during the Clinton administration. Approximately 46% had executive 
summaries that compared costs and benefits, ranging from about 25% during the first Bush 
administration to about 57% during the Clinton administration. Although most of the RIAs 
contained executive summaries, only a small fraction of them included all of the key calculations 
from the RIA.  
 
Use of Analytical Assumptions 
  A clear statement of important assumptions is essential to understanding an RIA. So, too, 
is the consistent application of basic ideas. Since an assessment of all key parameters was 
impossible, we examined the discount rate and the dollar year—two parameters that are critical 
to most RIAs. Including this information helps interested parties understand the results. 
Furthermore, many regulations have an important time component, meaning that either costs or 
benefits are spread out over multiple years. Failing to use the same dollar year or to discount 
future cash flows can be problematic when benefits and costs vary across time. 
The dollar year was identified in 73% of the RIAs, with a low of 69% during Bush and a 
high of 78% under Clinton. The discount rate was identified with similar frequency: 67% during 
the Reagan administration, 75% during the Bush administration and 83% during the Clinton 
administration. Figure 8 summarizes the presentation of the discount rate across administrations. 
Despite continuing academic debate over the correct discount rate to use in policy-making, a 
point estimate is much more common than a range estimate under all three administrations. Also, 
fewer than half of the RIAs specified whether the discount rate was real or nominal.  
 
B. Implications for Compliance with Executive Orders and OMB Guidelines
  Although low scores on our scorecard strongly suggest non-compliance with executive 
orders and OMB guidelines, they do not prove it. Both executive orders make exceptions for 
cases where information is difficult to obtain. It may be the case that all the items not included 
on an RIA were those that were difficult to obtain. In addition, some of the items we included on 
our scorecard are not explicitly required by the executive orders and OMB guidelines, though we 
think they are important components of a strong RIA. Nevertheless, we believe that there is 
evidence of at least some non-compliance with the executive orders and OMB guidelines.  
For example, although both executive orders clearly require an assessment of all costs 
and benefits of alternative approaches, fourteen RIAs do not examine alternatives. Since the EPA      14 
guidelines provide information on various alternatives for different types of regulation, it is hard 
to believe that this information was difficult to obtain (EPA 1983). Of course, it is nearly 
impossible to test whether EPA did everything it could have done, but we can examine whether 
the agency utilized the available information it developed in its cost-benefit analysis. We 
examine cases where the RIA presented some measure of the costs or benefits of the regulatory 
proposal and did not do so for alternatives. In such cases, the absence of key information for an 
alternative when such information was presented for the proposed method suggests that the 
information could have been provided, perhaps at some additional cost. Of the sixty RIAs that 
monetized at least some costs and considered at least one alternative, eleven did not monetize at 
least some costs of alternatives.  Of the thirty-seven RIAs that monetized at least some benefits 
and considered at least one alternative, thirteen did not monetize at least some benefits of 
alternatives. Of the forty-four RIAs that calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness and 
considered at least one alternative, ten did not calculate net benefits or cost effectiveness of 
alternatives. Finally, sixteen of the thirty-nine RIAs that monetized at least some costs and 
benefits did not calculate net benefits for the proposal.  
Consistent with earlier research, we also identified a number of cases in which the 
agencies quantified, but did not monetize benefits. For example, our sample includes two RIAs 
that quantified lives saved, but did not monetize any benefits, even though the Value of 
Statistical Life has been studied extensively. This suggests that limited knowledge and resource 
constraints do not offer a complete explanation for why the agency chose not to develop certain 
benefit estimates, since the additional expenditures for monetizing these benefits are, in these 
two cases, trivial. 
 
C. Trends in Quality and Variation in Quality 
Based on the results from our scorecard, we find no clear trend in the quality of cost-
benefit analysis across administrations. While these results do not rule out the possibility that 
RIAs are improving in ways we did not measure, they do show that some basic information is 
missing from RIAs in all three administrations. What is missing does change over time, but, as 
indicated in the figures, there is no clear trend. For example, Figures 3 and 5 reveal that while 
there has been some improvement in the calculation of net benefits and cost effectiveness, there 
has also been some decline in the consideration of alternatives. We performed a formal statistical 
analysis of the data, which also indicated that there is no strong statistical evidence of a change      15 
in RIA quality across administrations or time. The detailed methodology and results of this 
analysis are available online as supplementary material linked to the online manuscript.  
  While there does not appear to be a trend in quality, there does appear to be considerable 
variation both within and across administrations. To examine this issue further, we constructed 
two indices consisting of selected variables on which RIAs were scored. The index score for 
each RIA was defined as the percentage of questions on which the RIA received a positive score. 
The first index consisted of twenty-eight out of the scorecard’s seventy-nine questions. The 
second index was more restrictive, consisting of the six scorecard items that we thought were 
particularly important for determining the economic efficiency of a regulation. These were 
whether the RIA provided 1) a point estimate of total monetized costs; 2) a range for total 
monetized costs; 3) a point estimate of total monetized benefits; 4) a range for total monetized 
benefits; 5) a point estimate of total net benefits; and 6) a range for total net benefits. The 
correlation between these two indices is 71%, which means that an RIA that scored well on one 
index was likely to score well on the other. We examined how the scores of RIAs varied within 
administrations by graphing both indices over time. We found variation to be high both within 
and across administrations. These results and detailed information on the questions that were 
included in the two indices are available online as supplementary material linked to the online 
manuscript.  
 
V. Implications and Policy Recommendations 
 
Overall, the scorecard method is a useful, but imperfect tool for evaluating RIAs. Even if 
a regulatory agency complies with the executive orders and the OMB guidelines, the deeper 
issue concerning the assessment of quality remains to be addressed. A high score using our 
criteria does not necessarily mean that the agency performed a high quality analysis, because the 
agency could have masked analytical flaws. For example, the RIA for the rule reducing lead in 
gasoline was ranked highly by our scorecard and has been rated a high-quality regulation by 
Morgenstern (1997). The RIA for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone also 
scored very well, but the analysis has been sharply criticized. Although the RIA includes 
important economic information, some of the RIA’s assumptions are faulty. The cost estimates 
are not substantiated and the beneficial role of ozone in blocking UV-B radiation was ignored 
(Lutter and Gruenspecht 2001). Some regulations, such as information disclosure rules, have      16 
benefits that are very hard to quantify and are therefore likely to score very low on a scorecard, 
even if EPA did everything possible to analyze benefits. One example contained in this sample is 
the addition of industries to the toxic chemical release reporting Community Right-to-Know rule.  
Other rules may consider alternatives, but not necessarily alternatives that are most 
attractive from an economic point of view. The scoring used here only measures whether 
alternatives were considered, not whether they are reasonable or represent all potential 
alternatives. In many cases, RIAs do not consider carefully options that would allow for more 
flexibility to achieve social goals at lower costs. This was the case, for example, with recent rules 
involving lead and arsenic.  
Thus, it is unclear from our analysis how many RIAs are of high quality. A low score on 
the scorecard is an indicator of a potentially poor quality analysis, particularly if the agency did 
not assess key economic variables, such as the net benefits of a regulation. Many RIAs are 
missing fundamental economic information, making it difficult to effectively use the RIAs to 
make informed policy decisions. If quality is partly measured by the extent to which an RIA can 
contribute to better decision making, our analysis suggests that many RIAs are of poor quality.  
 
A. Why Are the Scores So Low?
A critical question raised by the results of our study is why compliance with cost-benefit 
requirements appears to have been relatively low and shows no clear sign of improving. We 
believe that there are several possible explanations.  One possible explanation is that the 
approach of political institutions toward the regulatory policy process has not changed much 
over the time period examined here. Congress has been willing to support some analysis of 
regulations to help inform the policy process, but it is not ready to let economic analysis drive 
the political debate on many issues. The president recognizes the need to introduce greater 
transparency and accountability into the regulatory process, but regulation is not generally an 
area where he wishes to spend limited political capital. While this explanation is consistent with 
the data, there are other explanations as well. For example, agency appointees, at EPA and 
elsewhere, do not face a strong incentive to do high-quality analysis. They are generally 
rewarded for promulgating and implementing regulations, not studying them.  
Moreover, analysis may be viewed only as a necessary evil. Indeed, there appear to be 
few sanctions for doing poor analysis. In addition, regulatory analyses are expensive to perform,      17 
and agencies often do not have the funding to conduct them effectively. Finally, there is limited 
political support for improving the economic analysis of pending regulations.  
An agency's RIA could receive a low score for at least three reasons. First, the agency 
may face resource constraints. A thorough cost-benefit analysis requires a great deal of scientific 
and economic information, and EPA may not have the resources to do the necessary research. 
Previously, however, we examined evidence that suggested that resource constraints are not a 
complete explanation for why the agency chose not to develop certain benefit estimates. 
Nonetheless, it may not always be feasible to quantify some benefits, for example, which can 
lead to lower scores. 
    A second reason is that the agency may not want interested parties to know that the 
benefits of the regulation may not justify the costs. Previous research suggests that a significant 
number of government rules would not pass a cost-benefit test based on those costs and benefits 
that had been quantified (Freeman 2002; Hahn et al. 2000). Specifically, Hahn et al. (2000), 
looked at several agencies during the Clinton administration and found that of the 31 RIAs that 
provided estimates of costs and benefits that were sufficient to calculate net benefits, only half 
had benefits and cost savings that exceeded the costs. Three-fourths of RIAs that calculated net 
benefits passed a cost-benefit test, while only one third of RIAs that did not calculate net benefits 
pass a cost-benefit test. Alternatively, EPA may not compare costs and benefits because the 
agency does not believe the comparison is instructive. For example, there may be too many 
benefits or costs that are not quantified for the comparison to be valuable. Even when all 
information is not available, however, we think it is useful to report a net benefit estimate with 
caveats then to not present one at all. In addition, EPA might not want to admit that a decision 
was the result of a political compromise. Alternatively, EPA may be reluctant to criticize a 
decision that was essentially made by Congress or the President.  
Third, the agency may simply not take the RIA requirement seriously because it is not 
enforced. We suspect that lack of political will on the part of the Executive Office of the 
President is a major factor in the high degree of noncompliance. There is a significant political 
cost to changing the behavior of a regulatory agency, but the political payoffs of doing so are 
typically low (Noll 1999).  
 
 
      18 
B. Recommendations for Reform 
There are many possible paths for reform—too numerous to mention here (Breyer 1993; 
Hahn 2000; Noll 1999). If the aim is to improve the quality and transparency of analysis, we 
would recommend two modest changes: the first is more vigilant oversight by OMB; the second 
is to use a standardized “Regulatory Impact Summary” that would accompany each regulatory 
impact statement (Farrow 2000; Hahn and Sunstein 2002). 
More vigilant oversight by OMB would put agencies on notice that the executive order 
requiring cost-benefit analysis needs to be taken seriously. Such efforts, to be effective, would 
require high-level White House support either from the vice president or the president. In 
addition, it would be helpful if Congress lent its support. 
The regulatory impact summary requirement could be implemented more easily by OMB. 
By requiring agencies to submit such a summary with each proposed regulation, OMB would 
encourage agencies to pay more attention to whether their analyses meet fundamental criteria. 
For example, if an agency is required to report whether it has quantified and monetized pollution 
benefits, identified a best estimate for the regulation’s expected net benefits, or identified the 
dollar year in which it has stated its estimates, the agency will be less inclined to submit an 
analysis that ignores these features.  
We do not believe this requirement would impose a significant burden on the agency 
because it does not require more analysis—only a summary of the analysis the agency has 
already done. Responding to a standardized set of straightforward questions about that analysis 
should require a minimal amount of extra time and resources. 
The benefits of this exercise however, could be significant. Such a summary could keep 
agencies focused on the key requirements of the executive orders. It could help regulators and 
decision makers determine the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying analysis. It would also 
facilitate a straightforward assessment of the degree to which regulatory analyses are meeting 
several important criteria. A standardized summary would also encourage standardized RIAs, 
which currently vary widely in format. 
The two changes suggested above could help make the regulatory process more 
transparent. Aside from being desirable for its own sake, this would serve two important 
purposes. First, it would give interested parties greater access to a key part of the regulatory 
process used to support a decision. Second, it would increase the probability that scholars would 
engage in independent regulatory analysis that could lead to improvements in regulation. Thus,      19 
greater transparency could both improve the decision-making process and create a better 
foundation for evaluating the analytical basis for decision-making. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
This paper has provided a systematic examination of a select sample of cost-benefit 
analyses that span the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. Our principal finding is that 
fundamental economic information was not reported in many of the RIAs, including information 
on relevant policy alternatives and information on net benefits. EPA’s analyses frequently did 
not provide adequate information about a proposed regulation to justify decisions to proceed 
with that regulation. The absence of information on net benefits is especially unfortunate because 
it is so closely linked to the goals of the executive orders. In addition, many RIAs lacked 
adequate summaries.  
Our analysis also suggests that many RIAs are of poor quality. Despite the limitations of 
the scorecard method, we believe that a low score on the scorecard is likely to be correlated with 
an analysis that experts would say was done poorly. Future research is needed to explore whether 
expert judgment about the quality of a regulatory analysis is correlated with the scorecard 
approach used here.  
We believe that all of the administrations could have done better in complying with the 
spirit or letter of the relevant executive orders and OMB guidelines. Because our sample covers 
two Republican presidents and one Democratic president, the lack of compliance cannot be 
explained simply by the party of the president.  
The picture we paint here is not as rosy as we would have hoped. Indeed, some 
academics have suggested to us that government cost-benefit analysis may be doomed because it 
is done in an intensely political environment. While it is true that such analyses are done in 
intensely political environments, this does not imply that they cannot be done better or used more 
effectively. Academics can be helpful here in two ways: first, by characterizing the impact of 
cost-benefit analysis in the real world; and second, by defining better ways to apply this tool that 
are also politically feasible.  
We offer one final thought that should give the optimists—those of us who see a 
constructive role for cost-benefit analysis—some reason for cheer. We are all relatively new at 
this game, especially in terms of real-world implementation. Knowledge about new processes 
accrues, and frequently diffuses, slowly. We are guardedly optimistic that cost-benefit analysis      20 
will be used more effectively twenty-five years from now than it is today, precisely because we 
will have learned more about its strengths and limitations in real-world settings.  
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Supplementary Material for  
“How Well Does the U.S. Government Do 
Cost-Benefit Analysis?”  
 
Robert W. Hahn and Patrick M. Dudley 
 
  The Supplementary Material includes a list of all the RIAs in the sample, a list of all the 
questions on the scorecard, a list of four missing RIAs, a note on the methodology, and an 
appendix with the technical explanations for two findings described in the paper. We also list 
additional references that we found useful. The list of RIAs is organized by presidential 
administration. Table 1 includes all the Reagan RIAs, Table 2 includes all the first Bush RIAs, 
and Table 3 includes all the Clinton RIAs. Table 4 lists the scorecard questions by number and 
organized by type. The note on methodology details the procedure followed for scoring. 
  The appendix describes the analysis used to support two conclusions in the paper: 1) that 
the quality of RIAs has not changed over time and 2) that the quality of individual RIAs varies 
widely within administrations. We describe the empirical methodology behind the first 
conclusion, detailing the statistical analyses we performed. We also present the summary 
statistics and the graphical evidence for the second conclusion. 
 
 
Table 1: RIAs from the Reagan Administration Used in this Study  
 
RIN Title  Date  of  RIA 
2070-AA07  Data Requirements for Registering Pesticides Under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
1982 
2040-xxx2
* Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines, New Source 
Performance Standards and Pretreatment Standards for the 
Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category 
1982 
2040-AA04  Effluent Standards and Limitations for the Metal Finishing 
Industry 
1983 
2060-AA62  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter 
1983 
2070-AA70  Nonsubstation PCB Transformers  1985 
2050-AA00  Proposed Standards for the Management of Used Oil  1985 
2060-AB30 Stack  Height  Regulations  1985 
2060-AC40  Listing of Surface Coal Mines for New Source Review  1985 
2060-AB50  Reducing Lead in Gasoline  1985 
2060-AA52  Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New 
Motor Vehicle Engines: Gaseous Emissions Regulations for 
1987 and Later Year Light-Duty Vehicles; and for 1988 and 
Later Model Year Light-Duty Trucks and Heavy-Duty 
Engines; Particulate Emission Regulations for 1988 and Later 
Model Year Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines 
1985 
2060-AA64  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen 
Dioxide 
1985 
2060-AA63  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon 
Monoxide 
1985 
       2 
RIN Title  Date  of  RIA 
2050-AA30(A)
+ Proposed Restrictions on Land Disposal of Hazardous Wastes 1985 
2060-AB33  New Source Performance Standards: Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units of Greater than 100 
million BTU/hr Heat Input 
1986 
2050-AA30(B)
+ Restrictions on Land Disposal of Certain Dioxin-Containing 
Wastes 
1986 
2060-AB68  Residential Wood Heater New Source Performance Standard 1986 
2050-AB19  Proposed Technical Standards for Underground Storage 
Tanks 
1987 
2050-AB65  Restrictions on Land Disposal of California List Wastes  1987 
2040-AA05  Effluent Guidelines Regulation for the Organic Chemicals, 
Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Industry 
1987 
2070-AB44  Schools Rule, Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act  1987 
2050-AC13  Land Disposal restrictions on First Third Wastes  1988 
2060-AC80  Protection of Stratospheric Ozone  1988 
2070-AB71  Rulemaking Under Section 313 of Title III of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
1988 
2060-AA61  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides 
(Sulfur Dioxide) 
1988 
2050-AA75  Revisions to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Contingency Plan 
1988 
2050-AB89  Financial Responsibility Requirements for Petroleum 
Underground Storage Tanks 
1988 
2070-AB29  Asbestos: Controls on Asbestos and Asbestos Products  1989 
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Table 2: RIAs from the Bush I Administration Used in this Study 
 
RIN Title  Date  of  RIA 
2060-AC26  Air Pollutant Emissions Standards and Guidelines for 
Municipal Waste Combustors 
1989 
2050-AB88  EPCRA Section 311 and 312: Emergency and Hazardous 
Chemical Inventory Forms and Community Right to Know 
Reporting Requirements  
1989 
2060-AB94 Hazardous  Waste  Treatment and Disposal Facilities: Organic 
Air Emission Standards for Tanks, Surface Impoundments, 
and Containers 
1989 
2060-AD91  Costs and Benefits of Phasing out CFCs and Halons  1989 
2050-AB21   Subtitle D Criteria for Solid Waste Landfills  1990 
2050-AA78 Toxicity  Characteristic  1990 
2050-AC73  Land Disposal Restrictions for Third Third Scheduled Wastes 1990 
2060-AB89  Phase II Gasoline Volatility Regulations  1990 
2060-AC00  Control of Sulfur and Aromatics Contents of On-Highway 
Diesel Fuel 
1990 
2040-AA55  National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for Synthetic 
Organic Compounds 
1990 
2050-AB70 Listings  of  Primary  and Secondary Oil/Water/Solids 
Separation Sludges from the Treatment of Petroleum 
Refinery Wastewaters 
1990 
2050-AC43  Listing of Certain Wood Preserving Wastes  1990 
2040-xxx3
* Land Application of Bleached Pulp and Paper Mill 
Wastewater Treatment Sludges 
1991 
2060-AD28  Reformulated Gasoline and Anti-Dumping Regulations  1991 
2040-AB51  Maximum Containment Level Goals and National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations for Lead and Copper 
1991 
2070-xxx4
* Pesticides and Ground Water Strategy: A Survey of Potential 
Impacts 
1991 
2060-AD74  Assessments of the Long-Run Costs of the Oxygenated Fuel 
Provisions 
1991 




* Compliance with Section 604 of the Clean Air Act for the 
Phaseout of Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
1992 
2050-AD25  CAA Section 112: Listing Regulated Substances and 
Thresholds and Mandating Risk Management Programs for 
Chemical Release Prevention  
1992 
2040-AB11  National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Phase V 
Synthetic Organic and Inorganic Chemicals 
1992 
2060-AD16  Screening for Operating Permits  1992 
2070-AA49  Worker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides  1992 
2060-AD89  Inspection and Maintenance Program  1992 
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Table 3: RIAs from the Clinton Administration Used in this Study 
 
RIN Title  Date  of  RIA 
2040-AB53  National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New 
Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard 
Category 
1993 
2060-AE29  Phase 2 Emission Standards for New Nonroad Spark-ignition 
Nonhandheld Engines at or below 19 kilowatts 
1994 
2060-AE54  New Gasoline Spark Ignition and Compression-Ignition 
Marine Engines; New Non-Road Compression-Ignition 
Engines and Spark-Ignition engines, Exemptions 
1994 
2060-AE27  Final Regulations for Revisions to the Federal Test Procedure 
for Emissions from Motor Vehicles 
1995 
2060-AF75  New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines Air 
Pollution Control: Voluntary Standards for Light-duty 
Vehicles; Final Rule 
1995 
2060-AF48  Acid Rain, Phase II, Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction 
Program 
1995 
2050-AD38  Land Disposal Restrictions Phase III; Decharacterized 
Wastewaters, Carbamate Wastes, and Spent Aluminum 
Potliners 
1996 
2050-AD26  Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk 
Management Programs under Clean Air Act Section 
112(r)(7) 
1996 
2060-AG06  Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Certification 
Standards for Deposit Control Gasoline Additives 
1996 
2070-AC64  Lead; Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in 
Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities 
1996 
2050-AD04  Financial Assurance Mechanisms for Local Government 
Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfill 
Facilities 
1996 
2070-AC71  Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors, Toxic 
Chemical Release Reporting, Community Right-to-Know 
1997 
2060-AE56  Revision of Standards of Performance for Nitrogen Oxide 
Emissions From New Fossil-Fuel Fired Steam Generating 
Units; Revisions to Reporting Requirements for Standards of 
Performance for New Fossil-Fuel Fired Steam Generating 
Units 
1997 
2060-AC62  Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: 
Hospital/medical/infectious Waste Incinerators 
1997 
2060-AE57  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Final 
Rule 
1997 
2060-AE66  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter; Final Rule 
1997 
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RIN Title  Date  of  RIA 
2060-AF76  Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-
duty Engines 
1997 
2060-AD33  Emission Standards for Locomotives and Locomotive 
Engines 
1997 
2070-AC01  Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls  1998 
2060-AH10  Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for 
Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group 
Region for Purposes of Reducing Transport of Ozone 
1998 
2040-AB82  National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants 
and Disinfection Byproducts 
1998 
2040-AC91  National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Interim 
Enhanced Surface Water Treatment 
1998 
2060-AF32  Regional Haze Regulations  1999 
 
Notes: RIN indicates “Regulation Identifier Number.” 
* Indicates that the real RIN could not be found or that none was given.  The number given is how the RIA is listed 
in the Joint Center RIA Database. 
+ Although both of these documents were considered part of the same rule, and therefore given the same RIN, we 
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Table 4: Variables Used in Data Collection 
 
Item Number   Variables 
 Estimation  of  Costs 
1  Stated costs exist 
2  Quantified at least some costs 
3  Monetized at least some costs 
4  Monetized all or nearly all costs 
5  Provided point estimate of total costs 
6  Provided range for total costs 
7  Associate costs w/ federal Government 
8  Associate costs w/ non-federal government 
9  Associate costs with producers 
10  Provided best estimate and range for total costs 
 Estimation  of  Benefits 
11  Stated benefits exist 
12  Quantified at least some benefits 
13  Monetized at least some benefits 
14  Monetized all or nearly all benefits 
15  Provided point estimate of total benefits 
16  Provided range for total benefits 
17  Monetized safety benefits 
18  Monetized health benefits 
19  Monetized pollution reduction benefits (not health related) 
20  Monetized pollution reduction benefits (health related) 
21  Provide best estimate or range for total benefits 
22  Provided best estimate and range for total benefits 
23  Monetized any health-related benefits 
  Comparison of Costs and Benefits 
24  Calculated net benefits 
25  Provided a point estimate of net benefits 
26  Provided a range for net benefits 
27  Calculated cost effectiveness 
28  Provided a point estimate of cost effectiveness 
29  Provided a range for cost effectiveness 
30  Provided a point estimate or range for total cost effectiveness 
31  Had positive net benefits 
32  Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness 
33  Calculated net benefits and cost effectiveness 
53  Calculated both point estimate and range for net benefits 
54  calculated either point estimate or range for net benefits 
  Evaluation of Alternatives 
34  Gave at least one alt. standard/level 
35  Gave at least one alt. method 
36  Quantified alternatives (costs) 
37  Monetized alternatives (costs) 
38  Quantified alternatives (benefits) 
39  Monetized alternatives (benefits) 
40  Cost effectiveness of alternatives 
41  Net benefits of alternatives  
42  Calculated net benefits or cost effectiveness of alternatives 
43  Considered some alternative 
 Clarity  of  Presentation 
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Item Number   Variables 
44  Contain executive summary 
45  Summary contains tables 
  Consistent Use of Analytical Assumptions 
46  Identified dollar year 
47  Used consistent dollar year 
48  Identified discount rate 
49  Used consistent discount rate 
50  Discount rate = 7% 
51  Consistent costs and benefits 
52  Identified and consistently used discount rate and dollar year 
 Lives 
55  Point estimate for number of lives saved 
56  Range estimate for number of lives saved 
57  What was the point (or range) estimate of lives saved? 
58  Point estimate for number of life-years saved 
59  Range estimate for number of life-years saved 
60  What was the point (or range) estimate of life-years saved? 
 VSL 
61  Point estimate for VSL 
62  Range estimate for VSL 
63  Point estimate for VSLY 
64  Range estimate for VSLY 
65  What was the point (and/or range) estimate of VSL or VSLY? 
66  Did RIA give $ year for VSL (or VSLY)? 
67  What was the $ year for VSL (or VSLY)? 
 Discount  Rate 
68  Point estimate for discount rate 
69  Range estimate for discount rate 
70  What was the point (and/or range) estimate for discount rate? 
71  Did the RIA specify real or nominal discount rate? 
72  Was the discount rate real or nominal? 
 Executive  Summary 
73  ES present at least some monetized costs 
74  ES present at least some monetized benefits 
75  ES present any measure of cost effectiveness 
76  ES present any estimate of net benefits 
77  ES offer a best judgment of how benefits and costs compare 
78  ES summarize any non-quantified benefits 
79  ES summarize any non-quantified costs 
 
Notes:  VSL indicates Value of Statistical Life. VSLY indicates Value of Statistical Life Year. ES indicates 
Executive Summary.  Item Number indicates the identification number used for a variable in the logit analysis.   
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Missing RIAs 
 
The largest online collection of regulatory impact analyses is the RIA Database located 
on the AEI-Brookings Joint Center website, www.aei-brookings.org. All of the RIAs used in this 
study are on the website. There are four RIAs that are on the website that are not used in this 
study. A list of these RIAs and the reason for not including them is below. 
 
RIN  Title  Date of RIA  Reason for Exclusion 
2050-AA21  EPA: Hazardous Waste Management 
System; Standards Applicable to Owners 
and Operators of Hazardous Waste 
Treatment, Storage, and Disposal 
Facilities, 47 FR 33274 
1982  We were only able to locate the 
Federal Register notice, not the actual 
RIA. 
2040-AB24  EPA: Drinking Water; National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations; Filtration, 
Disinfection; Turbidity, Giardia lamblia, 
Viruses, Legionella, and Heterotrophic 
Bacteria, 54 FR 27486 
1989  We were only able to locate the 
Federal Register notice , not the actual 
RIA. 
2060-AC68  EPA: National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 FR 38083 
1989  This RIA has many missing pages. 
2040-AB56  EPA: Water Quality Standards; 
Establishment of Numeric Criteria for 
Priority Toxic Pollutants; States' 
Compliance, 57 FR 60848 
1992  We were only able to locate the 
Federal Register notice, not the actual 
RIA. 
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Note on Methodology 
 
The scorecard for the study is based on the scorecard from Hahn et al. (2000). About one 
third of the questions from Hahn et al. (2000) were eliminated in order to focus on those areas 
that had produced the most meaningful results in the earlier paper. Some new questions were 
added and the wording of a few questions was changed. For example, Hahn et al. (2000) uses the 
term “best estimate,” but we decided “point estimate” was more appropriate. We included point 
estimates even if the RIA did not indicate whether the point was the best estimate or not. Most 
RIAs seemed to be giving a best estimate, but the distinction was not always made. 
Scoring of the RIAs for Reagan and Bush involved a primary scorer and a second 
individual who validated the findings of the first scorer. All primary scorers had at least a 
bachelor’s degree in economics. The primary scorer used the RIA to evaluate each item on the 
scorecard.  The second researcher validated the first researcher’s findings by reviewing the RIA 
and the completed scorecard. If the findings of the two researchers differed for any part of the 
scorecard, the researchers resolved the differences by discussion. Differences were generally rare 
because the questions are straightforward.  
A similar approach was used for Clinton RIAs that had been scored in a previous study. 
In this case, a researcher would complete a scorecard based on the RIA and use the scorecard 
from Hahn et al. (2000) as a check. 
       10 
Appendix 
 
We performed a formal statistical analysis of the data and confirmed that there was not 
much evidence of a change in RIA quality, measured as scores on our scorecard, across 
administration or time. There is also great deal of variation in the quality of individual cost-
benefit analyses. 
 
A. Trends in Quality 
  According to our measures of quality, there has been no significant time trend and no 
presidential administration is clearly better or worse than the other two. The intuition behind 
these results can be seen in the figures presented in the paper. Formal statistical tests support this 
conclusion. Specifically, we estimated several logit models where the dependent variable was the 
score received on a particular question and the independent variables included the cost of the rule 
and the originating office. Our control variables, including measures of time, generally were not 
significant under several different specifications. Table 5 summarizes the results from four of 
these specifications. 
  The dependent variable was the quality score (0 or 1) for each of a subset of questions for 
each of the RIAs. The questions used in the primary analysis are numbers 5-9, 11-13, 15-16, 32-
33, 37-39, 42-49, 68-69, 71 and 73-74. See Table 4 for more details on the questions. We 
primarily used a logit model, but the results were not sensitive to the choice of logit or probit.  
The independent variables were the year, a measure of the cost of the regulation in millions of 
2001 dollars, a dummy for which question was used, a dummy for each administration, and a 
dummy for each EPA office.  
The dummy for each question was introduced to control for the fact that some questions 
are harder to answer than others. This is reflected in the fact that the mean score varies 
considerably by question. We also ran specifications with interactions between a fixed effect for 
the general category of the question (costs, benefits or other) and the other control variables. The 
time variables were not significant in these versions of the model. 
The dummy for the office was aimed at determining whether some subjects might be 
easier for EPA to analyze than others. For example, air pollutants have generally been studied 
more extensively than hazards, so the air office might have an advantage when writing RIAs.  
Our results, however, do not really support this hypothesis. The dummy variables for originating 
office were generally not significant, although the water regulations consistently had the largest 
coefficient. 
The cost variable is included as a measure of the size of the regulation. EPA may devote 
more resources to analyzing rules that are very costly because those rules are likely to receive 
more scrutiny and cause more controversy. Therefore, other things being equal, one might expect 
the average quality of an RIA to increase with the size of the regulation being studied. There is 
limited evidence to support this hypothesis since the coefficient on cost was significant or nearly 
significant in some specifications. However, as shown in Table 5, the estimated cost coefficient 
was not robust. The removal of one outlier that is twice as expensive as the next costliest 
regulation has a large effect, even when costs are expressed as logarithms.
1
The specification presented in Table 5 includes two time variables, year and 
administration, allowing us to pick up possible linear and nonlinear time trends. In no case were 
                                                           
1 The outlier is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, which has an annualized cost of 
$8.6 billion. 
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these variables significant. This was also true for all the estimations not presented here. For 
example, the variables are still not significant if we only include year or only administration 
dummies. We also tried running each question separately, in order to test whether a time trend 
exists for some questions but not others. A few questions did have positive and significant time 
trends under this specification, including “RIA contains executive summary,” “Associates costs 
with Federal government,” and “Provided point estimate of total benefits.” This may be evidence 
of a positive time trend for at least a few questions, but it is fairly weak. Given that we are testing 
the coefficient on time in 28 separate estimations, we would expect a few false positives (i.e., 
type I errors). We conclude that there is no strong statistical evidence to suggest that the quality 
of RIAs is getting better or worse over time. 
In all of the estimations, we used a clustered standard error to account for the fact that 
questions from the same RIA are not truly independent observations. This turns out to be an 
important decision. If we do not use clustered standard errors, time variables become significant 
in several specifications. However, questions from the same RIA are clearly related. For 
example, if a question quantified benefits, it is more likely to have estimated cost effectiveness 
because the latter requires quantified benefits. This means that the error term in the equation for 
the question “Quantified benefits” is correlated with the error term in “Calculated at least some 
measure of cost effectiveness” within the same RIA. This, in turn, means that clustered standard 
errors are more appropriate. 
We conclude from this analysis that there is no significant time trend in the quality of 
RIAs, nor has any administration performed significantly better than the others. Given the 
evidence presented by the figures in the paper, this was expected. Somewhat surprising is the 
finding that the other control variables, cost of the regulation and originating office, were 
generally not significant either. This may support our belief, discussed in the paper, that 
relatively static institutional factors are a major factor in RIA quality. 
 
 
B. Variation in Quality 
  The scores of RIAs in our data vary considerably, even within administrations. To 
examine this issue, we constructed two indices consisting of various dimensions on which rules 
were scored. The index score for each RIA was defined as the percentage of questions on which 
the RIA received a positive score.  
  First, we considered an index, Index 1, that only included those questions included in the 
logit estimation described above. For the Reagan administration, the lowest score was 25 
percent, the mean was 55 percent and the highest score was 86 percent. For the Bush 
administration, the lowest score was 14 percent, the mean was 56 percent and the highest score 
was 89 percent. For the Clinton administration, the lowest score was 32 percent, the mean was 
56 percent and the highest score was 93 percent. The standard deviation of scores for Reagan-era 
rules (n=27) was 18%, the standard deviation for George H.W. Bush rules (n=24) was 22%, and 
the standard deviation for Clinton rules (n=23) was 21%. A Levene test of equal variances 
showed that we could not reject the hypothesis that the scores across administrations have equal 
variances. Figure 1 illustrates Index 1 over time graphically.  
  Second, we considered a more restrictive index, Index 2, that included only six questions, 
those which we thought were particularly important for determining the economic efficiency of a 
regulation. We considered whether the RIA provided 1) a point estimate of total monetized costs; 
2) a range for total monetized costs; 3) a point estimate of total monetized benefits; 4) a range for 
       12 
total monetized benefits; 5) a point estimate of total net benefits; and 6) a range for total net 
benefits. The Reagan and Bush administrations were very similar. For the Reagan 
administration, the lowest score was zero percent, the mean was 26 percent and the highest score 
was 83 percent. For the Bush administration, the lowest score was zero percent, the mean was 29 
percent and the highest score was 83 percent. For the Clinton administration, the scores were 
more tightly clustered, with the lowest score at 17 percent, a mean of 35 percent and the highest 
score at 67 percent. Figure 2 illustrates Index 2 over time graphically. 
  We also performed ordinary least squares regressions on both the original index of 
quality measures and the more restrictive index to determine whether these indices were affected 
by time. The year coefficient is positive but never significant for the broader index while the 
Bush and Clinton administration dummies are negative and significant. For the more restrictive 
index, the coefficient on year is positive and significant at the 10% level for some specifications, 
but, the administration dummies remain negative.
2 Overall, these results suggest, but do not 
prove, a positive time trend for the more important quality measures.  
 
 
                                                           
2 The independent variables that we used in the OLS regression were the same as the ones we used in the logit 
estimation in table 1. The coefficient on the year variable was 0.03, with a p-value of 0.1.  When we remove the 
outlier, the coefficient on year becomes 0.03, with a p-value of 0.07.  With robust standard errors, the p-values are 
0.11 and 0.08, respectively.  The year coefficient is not significant if we use log of costs instead of costs.   
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Table 5: Logit Estimations for Quality of RIA 
 
Estimation 1 









LogCost, Year (no 
outlier) 
Variable 
Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value 
Year .1  .2  .11  .16 .098 .21  .099 .22 
Cost  
(2001 $M) 
.00015 .11 .000016 .90         
Log of Cost          .22  .30  .12  .57 
Bush  -.41 .36  -.50  .27 -.36 .45  -.38 .42 
Clinton  -1.04  .22 -1.25 .16 -.88 .33  -.99 .28 
EPAair .09  .75  .13  .66  -.02  .94  .007  .98 
EPAwater .31  .42 .30 .43 .22 .06 .23  .56 
EPAtoxics -.075 .81  -.12  .71  -.11 .72 -.14 .67 
Log likelihood  -1166  -1156  -1133  -1120 
Observations 2072  2044  2016  1988 
Pseudo R2  .1810  .1783  .1820  .18 
Wald Chi2  666  687  647  629 
 
Notes: See text for more details. The dependent variable is 1 if the RIA contains the particular quality measure, 0 if 
not. The sample consists of 74 RIAs that span the Reagan, Bush I and Clinton administration from 1982 to 1999.  
We considered 28 quality measures, each of which had a fixed effect in the estimation that is not shown here. Two 
regulations, the New Source Performance Standard for New Residential Wood Heaters and the Financial Assurance 
Mechanisms for Local Government Owners and Operators of Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, had negative net 
costs. Since the logarithm of a negative number is undefined, these observations were dropped in the specifications 
involving the logarithm of cost.  
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Note: Index 1 represents one measure of quality. It is composed of 28 questions (5-9, 11-13, 15-16, 32-33, 37-39, 
42-49, 68-69, 71 and 73-74) and ranges from 0 to 1. See Table 4 for a list of the questions. 
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Note: Index 2 represents one measure of quality. It is composed of six questions (5-6, 15-16, and 25-26) and ranges 
from 0 to 1. See Table 4 for a list of the questions. 
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